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Abstract
Practicing and studying automated experimentation may benefit from philosophical reflection on
experimental science in general. This paper reviews the relevant literature and discusses central
issues in the philosophy of scientific experimentation. The first two sections present brief accounts
of the rise of experimental science and of its philosophical study. The next sections discuss three
central issues of scientific experimentation: the scientific and philosophical significance of
intervention and production, the relationship between experimental science and technology, and
the interactions between experimental and theoretical work. The concluding section identifies
three issues for further research: the role of computing and, more specifically, automating, in
experimental research, the nature of experimentation in the social and human sciences, and the
significance of normative, including ethical, problems in experimental science.
The rise of experimental science
Over the past decades the historical development of
experimental science has been studied in detail. One focus
has been on the nature and role of experiment during the
rise of the natural sciences in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. Earlier accounts of this so-called Scien-
tific Revolution emphasized the universalization of the
mathematical method or the mechanization of the world-
view as the decisive achievement. In contrast, the more
recent studies of sixteenth and seventeenth century sci-
ence stress the great significance of a new experimental
practice and a new experimental knowledge. Major figures
were Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, and Robert Boyle. The
story of the controversy of the latter with Thomas Hobbes,
during the late 1650s and early 1660s, has become a par-
adigm of the recent historiography of scientific experi-
mentation [1]. While Hobbes defended the 'old'
axiomatic-deductive style of the geometric tradition,
Boyle advocated the more modest acquisition of probable
knowledge of experimental 'matters of fact'. Simultane-
ously at stake in this controversy were the technical details
of Boyle's air-pump experiments, the epistemological jus-
tification of the experimental knowledge and the social
legitimacy of the new experimental style of doing science.
A more wide-ranging account of the role of experimenta-
tion in the natural sciences has been proposed by Thomas
Kuhn [2]. He claims that the rise of modern physical sci-
ence resulted from two simultaneous developments. On
the one hand, a radical conceptual and world-view change
occurred in what he calls the classical, or mathematical,
sciences, such as astronomy, statics and optics. On the
other, the novel type of Baconian, or experimental, sci-
ences emerged, dealing with the study of light, heat, mag-
netism and electricity, among other things. Kuhn argues
that it was not before the second half of the nineteenth
century that a systematic interaction and merging of the
experimental and mathematical traditions took place. An
example is the transformation of the Baconian science of
heat into an experimental-mathematical thermodynamics
during the first half of the nineteenth century. At about
the same time, the interactions between (at first, mainly
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tially. Important results of this scientification of technol-
ogy were chemical dye stuffs and artificial fertilizers.
Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century,
extensive experimentation also took root in various other
sciences. This happened in medicine, in particular in
physiology, somewhat later in psychology, and still later
in the social sciences. A characteristic feature of many
experiments in those sciences is a strong reliance on statis-
tical methods (see, e.g., [3]).
The rise of the philosophy of scientific 
experimentation
Alongside the actual practices of experimentation, a vari-
ety of authors--both philosophers and philosophy-
minded scientists--have reflected upon the nature and
function of scientific experiments. Among the better-
known examples are Bacon's and Galileo's advocacy of
the experimental method. John Stuart Mill (around the
middle of the nineteenth century) and Ernst Mach (late
nineteenth-early twentieth century) provided some meth-
odological and epistemological analyses of experimenta-
tion. Claude Bernard promoted and analyzed the use of
the experimental method in medicine. His Introduction to
the Study of Experimental Medicine [4] influenced a number
of twentieth century French writers, including Pierre
Duhem, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem.
While those authors addressed some aspects of experi-
mentation in their accounts of science, a substantial and
coherent tradition in the philosophy of scientific experi-
mentation did not yet arise.
Such a tradition did spring up in Germany, in the second
half of the twentieth century. Within this German tradi-
tion two approaches may be distinguished. One devel-
oped Hugo Dingler's pioneering work [5]. Dingler
emphasized the manipulation and intervention character
of experimentation, and hence its kinship to technology.
One of his aims was to show how the basic theoretical
concepts of physics, such as length or mass, could be
grounded in concrete experimental actions. During the
1960s and 1970s, this part of Dingler's views was taken up
and systematically developed by several other German
philosophers, including Paul Lorenzen, Klaus Holzkamp
and Peter Janich. More recently, the emphasis on the
methodical construction of theoretical concepts in terms
of experimental actions has given way to a more cultural-
istic interpretation of experimental procedures and results
[6].
A second approach within the German tradition took its
departure even more directly from the kinship between
experiment and technology. The major figure here is the
early Jürgen Habermas. In his work from the 1960s, Hab-
ermas conceived of (empirical-analytical) science as
'anticipated technology', the crucial link being experimen-
tal action [7]. In the spirit of Karl Marx, Martin Heidegger
and Herbert Marcuse, Habermas' aim was not merely to
develop a theory of (scientific) knowledge but rather a cri-
tique of technocratic reason. More recently, attempts have
been made to connect this German tradition to Anglo-
Saxon philosophy of experiment [8,9] and to contempo-
rary social studies of science and technology [10]. Recent
work on 'science as technology' by Sran Lelas [11] can be
characterized as, broadly, inspired by this second branch
of the German tradition.
In the English-speaking world, a substantial number of
studies of scientific experimentation have been written
since the mid-1970s. They resulted from the Kuhnian
'programs in history and philosophy of science'. In their
studies of (historical or contemporary) scientific contro-
versies, sociologists of scientific knowledge often focused
on experimental work (e.g., [12]), while so-called labora-
tory studies addressed the ordinary practices of experi-
mental scientists (e.g., [13]). An approach that remained
more faithful to the history and philosophy of science
idea started with Ian Hacking's argument for the relative
autonomy of experimentation and his plea for a philo-
sophical study of experiment as a topic in its own right
[14]. It includes work by Allan Franklin, Peter Galison,
David Gooding and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, among many
others (see the edited volumes [15,16] and [17]).
More recently, several philosophers argue that a further
step should be taken by combining the results of the his-
torical and sociological study of experiment with more
developed theoretical-philosophical analyses [18]. A
mature philosophy of experiment, they claim, should not
be limited to summing up its practical features but
attempt to provide a systematic analysis of experimental
practice and experimental knowledge. The latter is often
lacking in the sociological and historical literature on sci-
entific experimentation.
Intervention and production, and their 
philosophical implications
Looking at the specific features of experiments within the
overall practice of science, there is one feature that stands
out. In order to perform experiments, whether they are
large-scale or small-scale, experimenters have to intervene
actively in the material world; moreover, in doing so they
produce all kinds of new objects, substances, phenomena
and processes. More precisely, experimentation involves
the material realization of the experimental system (that
is to say, the object(s) of study, the apparatus, and their
interaction) as well as an active intervention in the envi-
ronment of this system. In this respect, experiment con-
trasts with theory even if theoretical work is alwaysPage 2 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
Automated Experimentation 2009, 1:2 http://www.aejournal.net/content/1/1/2attended with material acts (such as the typing or writing
down of a mathematical formula). Hence, a central issue
for a philosophy of experiment is the question of the
nature of experimental intervention and production, and
their philosophical implications. To be sure, at times sci-
entists devise and discuss so-called thought experiments
[19]. However, such 'experiments'--in which the crucial
aspect of intervention and production is missing--are bet-
ter conceived as not being experiments at all but rather as
particular types of theoretical argument, which may or
may not be materially realizable in experimental practice.
Clearly, not just any kind of intervention in the material
world counts as a scientific experiment. Quite generally,
one may say that successful experiments require, at least,
a certain stability and reproducibility, and meeting this
requirement presupposes a measure of control of the
experimental system and its environment as well as a
measure of discipline of the experimenters and the other
people involved in realizing the experiment.
Experimenters employ a variety of strategies for producing
stable and reproducible experiments (see, e.g., [20,21]
and [6]). One such strategy is to attempt to realize 'pure
cases' of experimental effects. For example, in some early
electromagnetic experiments carried out in the 1820s,
André Ampère investigated the interaction between an
electric current and a freely suspended magnetic needle
[22]. He systematically varied a number of factors of his
experimental system and examined whether or not they
were relevant, that is to say, whether or not they had a
destabilizing impact on the experimental process.
Furthermore, realizing a stable object-apparatus system
requires knowledge and control of the (actual and poten-
tial) interactions between this system and its environ-
ment. Depending on the aim and design of the
experiment, specific interactions may be necessary (and
hence required), allowed (but irrelevant), or forbidden
(because disturbing). Thus, in his experiments on electro-
magnetism, Ampère anticipated a potential disturbance
exerted by the magnetism of the earth. In response, he
designed his experiment in such a way that terrestrial mag-
netism constituted an allowed rather than a forbidden
interaction.
A further aspect of experimental stability is implied by the
notion of reproducibility [9]. A successful performance of
an experiment by the original experimenter is an achieve-
ment that may depend on certain idiosyncratic aspects of
a local situation. Yet, a purely local experiment that can-
not be carried out in other experimental contexts will, in
the end, be unproductive for science. However, since the
performance of an experiment is a complex process, no
repetition will be strictly identical to the original experi-
ment and many repetitions may be dissimilar in several
respects. For this reason, we need to specify what we take
or require to be reproducible (for instance, a particular
aspect of the experimental process or a certain average
over different runs). Furthermore, there is the question of
who should be able to reproduce the experiment (for
instance, the original experimenter, contemporary scien-
tists, or even any scientist or human being). Investigating
these questions leads to different types and ranges of
experimental reproducibility, which can be observed to
play different roles in experimental practice.
Laboratory experiments in physics, chemistry and molec-
ular biology often allow one to control the objects under
investigation to such an extent that the relevant objects in
successive experiments may be assumed to be in identical
states. Hence, statistical methods are employed primarily
to further analyze or process the data (see, for instance,
the error-statistical approach by Deborah Mayo [23]). In
contrast, in field biology, medicine, psychology and social
science, such a strict experimental control is often not fea-
sible. To compensate for this, statistical methods in these
areas are used directly to construct groups of experimental
subjects that are presumed to possess identical average
characteristics. It is only after such groups have been con-
structed that one can start the investigation of hypotheses
about the research subjects. One can phrase this contrast
in a different way by saying that in the former group of sci-
ences statistical considerations mostly bear upon linking
experimental data and theoretical hypotheses, while in
the latter group it is often the case that statistics already
play a role at the stage of producing the actual individual
data.
The intervention and production aspect of scientific
experimentation carries implications for several philo-
sophical questions. A general lesson, already drawn by
Bachelard, appears to be this: the intervention and pro-
duction character of experimentation entails that the
actual objects and phenomena themselves are, at least in
part, materially realized through human interference.
Hence, it is not just the knowledge of experimental objects
and phenomena but also their actual existence and occur-
rence that prove to be dependent on specific, productive
interventions by the experimenters. This fact gives rise to
a number of important philosophical issues. If experi-
mental objects and phenomena have to be realized
through active human intervention, does it still make
sense to speak of a 'natural' nature or does one merely deal
with artificially produced laboratory worlds? If one does
not want to endorse a fully-fledged constructivism,
according to which the experimental objects and phe-
nomena are nothing but artificial, human creations, one
needs to develop a more differentiated categorization of
reality. In this spirit, various authors (e.g., [20,9]) havePage 3 of 8
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science needs some kind of dispositional concepts, such
as powers, potentialities, or tendencies. These human-
independent dispositions would then underlie and ena-
ble the human construction of particular experimental
processes.
A further important question is whether scientists, on the
basis of artificial experimental intervention, can acquire
knowledge of a human-independent nature. Some philos-
ophers claim that, at least in a number of philosophically
significant cases, such 'back inferences' from the artificial
laboratory experiments to their natural counterparts can
be justified. Another approach accepts the constructed
nature of much experimental science, but stresses the fact
that its results acquire a certain endurance and autonomy
with respect to both the context in which they have been
realized in the first place and later developments. In this
vein, Davis Baird [24] offers an account of 'objective thing
knowledge', the knowledge encapsulated in material
things, such as Watson and Crick's material double helix
model or the Indicator of Watt and Southern's steam
engine.
Another relevant feature of experimental science is the dis-
tinction between the working of an apparatus and its the-
oretical accounts. In actual practice it is often the case that
experimental devices work well, even if scientists disagree
on how they work. This fact supports the claim that variety
and variability at the theoretical level may well go together
with a considerable stability at the level of the material
realization of experiments. This claim can then be
exploited for philosophical purposes, for example to vin-
dicate entity realism [14] or referential realism [8].
The relationship between (experimental) 
science and technology
Traditionally, philosophers of science have defined the
aim of science as, roughly, the generation of reliable
knowledge of the world. Moreover, as a consequence of
explicit or implicit empiricist influences, there has been a
strong tendency to take the production of experimental
knowledge for granted and to focus on theoretical knowl-
edge. However, if one takes a more empirical look at the
sciences, both at their historical development and at their
current condition, this approach must be qualified as one-
sided. After all, from Archimedes' lever-and-pulley sys-
tems to the cloned sheep Dolly, the development of
(experimental) science has been intricately interwoven
with the development of technology ([25,26]). Experi-
ments make essential use of (often specifically designed)
technological devices, and, conversely, experimental
research often contributes to technological innovations.
Moreover, there are substantial conceptual similarities
between the realization of experimental and that of tech-
nological processes, most significantly the implied possi-
bility and necessity of the manipulation and control of
nature. Taken together, these facts justify the claim that
the science-technology relationship ought to be a central
topic for the study of scientific experimentation.
One obvious way to study the role of technology in sci-
ence is to focus on the instruments and equipment
employed in experimental practice. Many studies have
shown that the investigation of scientific instruments is a
rich source of insights for a philosophy of scientific exper-
imentation (see, e.g. [15,17,18] and [27]). One may, for
example, focus on the role of visual images in experimen-
tal design and explore the wider problem of the relation-
ship between thought and vision. Or one may investigate
the problem of how the cognitive function of an intended
experiment can be materially realized, and what this
implies for the relationship between technological func-
tions and material structures. Or one may study the
modes of representation of instrumentally mediated
experimental outcomes and discuss the question of the
epistemic or social appraisal of qualitative versus quanti-
tative results.
In addition to such studies, several authors have proposed
classifications of scientific instruments or apparatus. One
suggested distinction is that between instruments that rep-
resent a property by measuring its value (e.g., a device that
registers blood pressure), instruments that create phe-
nomena that do not exist in nature (e.g., a laser), and
instruments that closely imitate natural processes in the
laboratory (e.g., an Atwood machine, which mimics proc-
esses and properties of falling objects).
Such classifications form an excellent starting point for
investigating further philosophical questions on the
nature and function of scientific instrumentation. They
demonstrate, for example, the inadequacy of the empiri-
cist view of instruments as mere enhancers of human sen-
sory capacities. Yet, an exclusive focus on the instruments
as such may tend to ignore two things. First, an experi-
mental setup often includes various 'devices', such as a
concrete wall to shield off dangerous radiation, a support
to hold a thermometer, a spoon to stir a liquid, curtains to
darken a room, and so on. Such devices are usually not
called instruments, but they are equally crucial to a suc-
cessful performance and interpretation of the experiment
and hence should be taken into account. Second, a strong
emphasis on instruments may lead to a neglect of the
environment of the experimental system, especially of the
requirement to control the interactions between the
experimental system and its environment. Thus, a com-
prehensive view of scientific experimentation needs to go
beyond an analysis of the instrument as such by takingPage 4 of 8
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ment needs to function.
Finally, there is the issue of the general philosophical sig-
nificance of the experiment-technology relationship.
Some of the philosophers who emphasize the importance
of technology for science endorse a 'science-as-technol-
ogy' account. That is to say, they advocate an overall inter-
pretation in which the nature of science--not just
experimental but also theoretical science--is seen as basi-
cally or primarily technological (see for instance, [5,7]
and [11]). Other authors, however, take a less radical view
by criticizing the implied reduction of science to technol-
ogy and by arguing for the sui generis character of theoret-
ical-conceptual and formal-mathematical work. Thus,
while stressing the significance of the technological--or
perhaps, more precisely, the intervention and production
dimension of science--these views nevertheless see this
dimension as complementary to a theoretical dimension
(see, e.g., [8,24] and [28]).
The role of theory in experimentation
This brings us to a further central theme in the study of sci-
entific experimentation, namely the relationship between
experiment and theory. The theme can be approached in
two ways. One approach addresses the question of how
theories or theoretical knowledge may arise from experi-
mental practices. Thus, Franklin [21] has provided
detailed descriptions and analyses of experimental confir-
mations and refutations of theories in twentieth century
physics. Giora Hon [28] has put forward a classification of
experimental error, and has argued that the notion of
error may be exploited to elucidate the transition from the
material, experimental processes to propositional, theo-
retical knowledge (see also [29]).
A second approach to the experiment-theory relationship
examines the question of the role of existing theories, or
theoretical knowledge, within experimental practices.
Over the last 25 years, this question has been debated in
detail. Are experiments, factually or logically, dependent
on prior theories, and if so, in which respects and to what
extent? The remainder of this section reviews some of the
debates on this question.
The strongest version of the claim that experimentation is
theory dependent says that all experiments are planned,
designed, performed, and used from the perspective of
one or more theories about the objects under investiga-
tion. In this spirit, Justus von Liebig and Karl Popper,
among others, advocated the view that all experiments are
explicit tests of existing theories. This view completely
subordinates experimental research to theoretical inquiry.
However, on the basis of many studies of experimentation
published during the last 25 years, it can be safely con-
cluded that this claim is false. For one thing, quite fre-
quently the aim of experiments is just to realize a stable
phenomenon or a working device. Yet, the fact that exper-
imentation involves much more than theory testing does
not, of course, mean that testing a theory may not be an
important goal in particular scientific settings.
At the other extreme, there is the claim that, basically,
experimentation is theory-free. The older German school
of 'methodical constructivism' (see [6]) came close to this
position. A somewhat more moderate view is that, in
important cases, theory-free experiments are possible and
do occur in scientific practice. This view admits that per-
forming such 'exploratory' experiments does require some
ideas about nature and apparatus, but not a well-devel-
oped theory about the phenomena under scrutiny. Ian
Hacking [14] and Friedrich Steinle [22] make this claim
primarily on the basis of case studies from the history of
experimental science. Michael Heidelberger [30] aims at a
more systematic underpinning of this view. He distin-
guishes between theory-laden and causally-based instru-
ments and claims that experiments employing the latter
type of instruments are basically theory-free.
Another view admits that not all concrete activities that
can be observed in scientific practice are guided by theo-
ries. Yet, according to this view, if certain activities are to
count as a genuine experiment, they require a theoretical
interpretation (see [8,9,28] and [31]). More specifically,
performing and understanding an experiment depends on
a theoretical interpretation of what happens in materially
realizing the experimental process. In general, quite differ-
ent kinds of theory may be involved, such as general back-
ground theories, theories or theoretical models of the
(material, mathematical, or computational) instruments,
and theories or theoretical models of the phenomena
under investigation.
One argument for such claims derives from the fact that
an experiment aims to realize a reproducible correlation
between an observable feature of the apparatus and a fea-
ture of the object under investigation. The point is that
materially realizing this correlation and knowing what
can be learned about the object from inspecting the appa-
ratus depends on theoretical insights about the experi-
mental system and its environment. Thus, these insights
pertain to those aspects of the experiment that are relevant
to obtaining a reproducible correlation. It is not necessary,
and in practice it will usually not be the case, that the the-
oretical interpretation offers a full understanding of any
detail of the experimental process.
A further argument for the significance of theory in exper-
imentation notes that a single experimental run is not
enough to establish a stable result. A set of different runs,Page 5 of 8
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or less, variable. The questions then are: What does this
fact tell us about the nature of the property that has been
measured? Does the property vary within the fixed inter-
val? Is it a probabilistic property? Or is its real value con-
stant and are the variations due to random fluctuations?
In experimental practice, answers to such questions are
based on an antecedent theoretical interpretation of the
nature of the property that has been measured.
Regarding these claims, it is important to note that, in
actual practice, the theoretical interpretation of an experi-
ment will not always be explicit and the experimenters
will not always be aware of its use and significance. Once
the performance of a particular experiment or experimen-
tal procedure becomes routine, the theoretical assump-
tions drop out of sight: they become like an (invisible)
'window to the world'. Yet, in a context of learning to per-
form and understand the experiment or in a situation
where its result is very consequential or controversial, the
implicit interpretation will be made explicit and subjected
to empirical and theoretical scrutiny. This means that the
primary locus of the theoretical interpretation is the rele-
vant scientific community and not the individual experi-
menter.
In conclusion: further issues in scientific 
experimentation
As we have seen, the systematic philosophical study of sci-
entific experimentation is a relatively recent phenome-
non. Hence, there are a number of further issues that have
received some attention but merit a much more detailed
account. In concluding this review paper, three such issues
will be briefly discussed.
First, recent scientific practice shows an ever-increasing
use of 'computer experiments'. These involve various sorts
of hybrids of material intervention, computer simulation,
and theoretical and mathematical modeling techniques
(see [32]). Often, more traditional experimental
approaches are challenged and replaced by approaches
resting fully or primarily on computer simulations (some-
times this replacement is based on budgetary considera-
tions only). More generally, there is a large variety of uses
of computer science and technology in performing, ana-
lyzing and interpreting experiments and in visualizing,
storing and disseminating their results. Automated exper-
imentation constitutes a significant part of these develop-
ments.
These new developments raise important questions for
the scholarly study of scientific experimentation. First,
although some pioneering work has been done (see, for
instance, [33] about the role of databases, and, more gen-
erally, bioinformatics in research in the life sciences), we
need many more empirical studies that chart this new ter-
rain. Furthermore, new methodological questions arise
about how to do this automated experimentation in inno-
vative, yet plausible, ways. As the history of Artificial Intel-
ligence teaches us, expectations about automation can
sometimes be overenthusiastic and unfounded ([34,35]).
For this reason, a critical assessment of what can, and
what cannot, be achieved through automation is particu-
larly important (for the cases of formal symbol manipula-
tion and neural network approaches to AI, see [36], chaps.
5 and 12). Related to this is the epistemological question
of the justifiability of the results of the new approaches.
Should experiments always involve a substantial material
component or are simulated experiments equally reliable
and useful (see [37])? Finally, computer experiments are
regularly applied to complex and large-scale systems, for
instance in climate science. Often, in such contexts, scien-
tific and policy problems are intimately connected. This
connection also constitutes an important topic for the
study of scientific experimentation (see, e.g., [38]).
A second issue that merits more attention is the nature
and role of experimentation in the social and human sci-
ences, such as economics, sociology, medicine, and psy-
chology. Practitioners of those sciences often label
substantial, or even large, parts of their activities as 'exper-
imental'. So far, this fact is not reflected in the philosoph-
ical literature on experimentation, which has primarily
focused on the natural sciences. Thus, a challenge for
future research is to connect the primarily methodological
literature on experimenting in economics, sociology,
medicine, and psychology with the philosophy of science
literature on experimentation in natural science (see, e.g.,
[39] and [40]).
One subject that will naturally arise in philosophical
reflection upon the similarities and dissimilarities of nat-
ural and social or human sciences is this: In experiments
on human beings, the experimental subjects will often
have their own interpretation of what is going on in these
trials, and this interpretation may influence their
responses over and above the behavior intended by the
experimenters. As a methodological problem (of how to
avoid 'biased' responses) this is of course well known to
practitioners of the human and social sciences. However,
from a broader philosophical or socio-cultural perspective
the problem is not necessarily one of bias. It may also
reflect a clash between a scientific and a common-sense
interpretation of human beings. In case of such a clash,
social and ethical issues are at stake, since the basic ques-
tion is who is entitled to define the nature of human
beings: the scientists or the people themselves? The meth-
odological, ethical, and social issues springing from this
question will continue to be a significant theme for thePage 6 of 8
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This brings us to a last issue. The older German tradition
explicitly addressed wider normative questions surround-
ing experimental science and technology. The views of
Habermas, for example, have had a big impact on broader
conceptualizations of the position of science and technol-
ogy in society. Thus far, the more recent Anglophone
approaches within the philosophy of scientific experi-
mentation have primarily dealt with more narrowly cir-
cumscribed scholarly topics. In so far as normative
questions have been taken into account, they have been
mostly limited to epistemic normativity, for instance to
questions of the proper functioning of instruments or the
justification of experimental evidence. Questions regard-
ing the connections between epistemic and social or ethi-
cal normativity are hardly addressed.
Yet, posing such questions is not far-fetched. For instance,
those experiments that use animals or humans as experi-
mental subjects are confronted with a variety of normative
issues, often in the form of a tension between methodo-
logical and ethical requirements [41]. Other normatively
relevant questions relate to the issue of the artificial and
the natural in experimental science and science-based
technology. Consider, for example, the question of
whether experimentally isolated genes are natural or arti-
ficial entities. This question is often discussed in environ-
mental philosophy, and different answers to it entail a
different environmental ethics and politics. More specifi-
cally, the issue of the contrast between the artificial and
the natural is crucial to debates about patenting, in partic-
ular the patenting of genes and other parts of organisms.
The reason is that discoveries of natural phenomena are
not patentable while inventions of artificial phenomena
are [42].
Although philosophers of experiment cannot be expected
to solve all of those broader social and normative prob-
lems, they may be legitimately asked to contribute to the
debate on possible approaches and solutions. In this
respect, the philosophy of scientific experimentation
could profit from its kinship to the philosophy of technol-
ogy, which has always shown a keen sensitivity to the
interconnectedness between technological and social or
normative issues.
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